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Abstract
Innovative systems and infrastructures such as
smart grids, the internet of things, cities, or highways
require generally accepted common compatibility
standards to enable components of such systems to
interoperate. In some cases, various standards are
developed by competing standards organizations,
often resulting in standards battles. This paper
focuses on factors that affect the outcome of these
standards battles, and, specifically, on the effect of an
influential position in an industry-wide standards
networks and the existence of structural holes in that
network on standard dominance. The empirical
context
is
the
consumer
electronics,
telecommunications, and ICT arenas. We conduct a
study of 103 standards organizations from 2000 to
2011. We find support for the hypothesis that
standards that are supported by standards
organizations that have a central position in the
industry-wide standards network have a high chance
of achieving dominance. Thus, we show that apart
from complementary assets and innovation
strategies, firms can also adopt specific networking
strategies to achieve a successful standard.

1. Introduction
A market that is characterized by increasing
returns to adoption often results in the establishment
of a single dominant design. One important
underlying reason for this is the existence of network
effects, whereby products increase in value the more
they are adopted by end users [1, 2]. Often, in these
markets, battles amongst compatibility standards are
waged resulting in a ‘winner takes all’ situation [3].
Standards are essential elements that define
technological platforms as when single dominant
standards are established, innovations in the form of
new platforms may be achieved whereby the
compatibility standards act as interfaces that ensure
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the interoperability of the distinct components.
Indeed, as Baldwin and Woodard [4] argue, a
system’s interfaces as a whole constitute the
technological platform.
Examples of standards battles include the battle
between AC versus DC current, VHS versus
Betamax, Multimedia compact disc versus Super
Density Disc, and the more recent Blu-ray versus
HD-DVD case [3, 5, 6]. Various scholars have
assessed the outcome of these battles by discussing
factors for standard dominance [7].
The topic has been studied from multiple angles.
Although evolutionary economists argue that
standards are established through path dependent
mechanisms and firms cannot directly influence the
outcome of standards battles [8], industrial
economists emphasize the importance of market
mechanisms such as pricing mechanisms, and
network and bandwagon effects [1, 2]. Technology
management scholars borrow from industrial
economists and emphasize the importance of quickly
building an installed base [3]. They argue that
resources (e.g. financial resources or reputation) may
enable a standard supporter to devise certain
strategies (e.g. timing of entry or marketing) to
accumulate installed base [9]. Other scholars
approach the topic from a governance perspective
[10] or institutional perspective [11]. Recently,
weights have been established for factors for standard
dominance for a diverse range of contexts including
building automation systems and wireless data
communication [12-14].
Although studies have illustrated and analyzed
the effect of standards network composition on
standard dominance [5, 6, 15], little has been written
about the role of the structural characteristics of
standards networks on the chances that the standards
achieve dominance (exceptions include [16, 17]. We
address this gap in the literature and propose that the
actors that support the standard, and specifically,
their structural position in an industry-wide standards
network play an important role in whether this
standard will reach dominance in the market.
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Research has shown that networks provide benefits to
participants in the network. For example, a firm’s
competitive position may be enhanced by forming
relationships within the network [18, 19]. Networks
can provide information and learning benefits to their
members [20, 21]. We explore these benefits in the
context of standardization. Specifically, we address
the question: what is the influence of the structural
network position of a standards organization in an
industry-wide standards network on the chances that
the standard that is promoted by the standards
organization achieves dominance?
In this paper, we distinguish between two types of
networks; standards organizations and industry-wide
standards networks. A standards organization is
defined as a collection of actors that develop and/or
promote a particular standard. Examples of such
standards organizations are standards alliances (such
as the WIFI alliance), and standards committees
(such as the IEEE802.11 committee). An industrywide standards network is the total set of actors
(standards organizations and or firms) in a specific
industry, and their relationships. An example is the
set of firms involved in standards organizations in the
data communication industry and their relations [22].

2. Theory and Hypotheses
The literature on social and inter-organizational
networks mentions several benefits of establishing
inter-organizational relationships in general. Firms
can gain access to key assets, resources, and
capabilities, and they can improve their strategic
position through their relationships with other actors
in the network [18, 19]. These benefits may also
apply to standards organizations. For example, a
standard supporter can provide access to
complementary assets [23] that are essential for
establishing standard dominance [7]. Such
complementary assets include reputation and
financial resources [3]. Moreover, by establishing
relationships
with
manufacturers
of
(key)
complementary goods [5], firms can gain control
over the availability and supply of these goods. A
large availability of complementary goods leads to an
increase in installed base and to standard dominance
[24,
25].
Furthermore,
inter-organizational
relationships can lead to collective action and
coordination of tasks [6, 26], both of which are
required to create a successful standard. Interorganizational relationships can provide access to
novel information and facilitate learning among
actors. In fact, research has indicated that firms
participating in standards organizations more

frequently use each other’s patents [27] increasing
innovation output. Firms can also gain access to tacit
capabilities [28] or inaccessible knowledge [20]
through their network partners.

2.1. Influential position
When a standards battle is fought, it mostly
occurs between rival standards organizations. For
example, in the battle for a high density optical disk
standard, Blu-ray battled against HD-DVD. Both
standards were promoted by rival standards
organizations. Eventually, Blu-ray won which
spurred technological innovation in the form of Bluray disc players and gaming consoles, but also in the
form of complementary goods (movies, games, etc.)
[29]. The presence of large powerful firms in a
standards organization is often an incentive for
smaller firms to join. They strengthen the
organization by increasing available resources and
knowledge [23, 30]. Hence, influential firms can
convince other firms directly or indirectly to join
standards organizations. However, besides being
influential in (local) standards organizations, firms
can also exert influence in an industry-wide standards
network. They may have sufficient resources to
participate in multiple standards organizations, and
by doing so, assume an influential position in the
industry-wide standards network.
First, by taking on an influential position in an
industry-wide standards network, firms can gain
access to knowledge and information faster and can
access multiple short paths to other firms and
standards organizations within the industry-wide
network. As these members interact with more firms
and participate in more organizations, they can also
learn from actors and obtain external knowledge
[31]. Indeed, it has been argued that a firm’s network
position positively relates to its innovation output
[32, 33]. As information diffuses through the network
from actor to actor, it is important to keep the paths
to other firms and organizations short as information
is transmitted faster and with more integrity through
a network with shorter paths [22, 31]. The electronics
market is characterized by rapid technological change
and fast changing consumer preferences, and it is
therefore important for standards organizations and
firms to adapt their standards or products swiftly to
keep up with the pace of technological progress and
to satisfy consumer needs. Acquiring information
before the competition can create a competitive
advantage [34]. By implementing this information
into the standard, the standard can be adapted to
customer needs better and will therefore be more
successful [6].
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Second, by taking on a central and influential
position in the network, firms can exert more
influence on other actors in the network [33] and can
also spread information to other actors more easily
[26]. Potential partners can become interested if they
receive information about the standard and the
organization behind it through their network [35]. As
the organization becomes a central point in an
industry-wide network, its reach becomes larger,
enabling actors to form more partnerships, and
enhancing reputation and trust [31]. Through this
increased exposure, its actions become more visible,
and the organization can better promote the supported
standard. The promotion of the standard might
persuade supporting firms in other (possibly
competing) standards organizations to join the
standards organization so that they can use the
standard in their own products. These new member
firms can implement the standard in their products,
thereby increasing the installed base and the number
of complementary products and positively
influencing the chances of standard dominance [25].
Hence, we posit that the influential position of the
members of a standards organization can raise the
level of influence of the standards organization,
increasing the chances of success of the standard.
Hypothesis 1: A standard that is supported by a
standards organization that has a more influential
position in an industry-wide standards network has a
higher chance of achieving dominance.

2.2. Structural holes
All ties can provide information, but ties can
become redundant if the same information comes
from different ties. Therefore non-redundant ties
should be fostered, because they can provide
different information more efficiently [36, 37]. Nonredundant ties exist when there are few connections
between separate groups of actors. Due to the limited
number of connections between the two groups of
actors, the actors in the different groups possess
different information. The separations between these
groups are called structural holes [36]. Structural
holes can be bridged by actors that have ties with
both groups. As the different sides of the structural
hole hold different information, a bridging actor can
create value by combining information [37]. Firms
that can successfully bridge these structure holes can
serve as an obligatory passage point for information
across the structural hole [38]. Firms active in
different markets or niches will interact less often
than firms active in the same market. Structural holes

will therefore likely exist between different markets
or niches.
Structural holes may also exist in industry-wide
standards networks. The presence of structural holes
means that only a few connections between the
groups on different sides of the holes exist.
Therefore, valuable consumer preference information
is not available to other standards organizations, but
only to the standards organization that bridges the
structural hole. Consequently, this information can
result in a competitive advantage for the standards
organization that bridges the structural hole as to
launch a standard successfully in a new market or
niche, information about consumer preferences and
the market environment is needed to determine the
successful
innovation
strategy.
Furthermore,
standards organizations that bridge structural holes
and have access to valuable consumer preference
information from different markets can use this
information to adapt the properties of the standard to
consumer demand in multiple markets. This would
enable successful launching of the standards in
multiple industries, which would increase the
potential market size of the standard. Furthermore, by
adapting standards to user requirements, more diverse
firms will adopt the standard [6]. Launching products
implementing the standard in different markets
increases the installed base and the number and
variety of complementary products, and consequently
increases the chances of standard dominance [25].
Therefore we posit:
Hypothesis 2: A standard that is supported by a
standards organization that can successfully bridge
structural holes in the industry-wide standards
network has a higher chance of achieving dominance

3. Method
This study uses data on standards, standards
organizations, and firms participating in the
information technology, consumer electronics and
telecommunications market in the period from 2000
to 2011. The data was collected from archived
websites
of
standards
organizations
(webarchive.com), press archives, and information
from databases such as the Lexis-Nexis and Thomson
One Banker. Examples of standards battles that were
taken into account are USB vs Firewire and WiFi vs
HomeRF. These battles were fought in the period
2000-2011. USB and Firewire define data
communicatiosn between the PC and peripheral
devices and HomeRF and WiFi are standards that
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define wireless data communication. We refer to [39]
for a more detailed illustration of these cases.
We represent the standards organizations by the
members that participate at the highest strategic level
of the organization. These members can actually
influence the strategic direction of the organization
and the standard as they formally approve the
specifications of the standard. In most standards
organizations, this is the board of directors. In other
standards organizations, it is the equivalent highest
organizational level which has the power to vote. The
board consists of individuals that represent their
organization. This study looks at the firms which
these people represent and takes these firms to be
board members.
This study uses a sample of 103 standards
organizations, which in total constitutes 644 complete
observations. As the number of standards
organizations is relatively large compared to the
average number of observations per standards
organizations, the results from this analysis will be
efficient and consistent.
Using board membership data, we created a
bipartite network of standards organizations and
firms. Connections between standards organizations
and firms are created through board memberships.
We analyzed this network using the program UCInet.
As the mathematics used to analyze social networks
require square matrices, we converted the rectangular
affiliation data matrices to square matrices by
calculating the biadjacency matrix; a square matrix of
dimensions
[40].
The network characteristics are operationalized
using centralities which are normalized to enable
comparison between the networks. As connections
are only possible between the two different types of
actors, the maximum number of connections in the
biadjacency is lower than the theoretical maximum of
an ordinary
, and therefore a different
normalization is necessary which can be calculated
using the program UCInet.
We tested the effects of the network
characteristics on standard dominance by using
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). As the
database contains data in long format, a regression
method that could account for repeated
measurements was necessary. GEE was specifically
developed to analyze longitudinal data with repeated
measurements.
It accounts for repeated
measurements by determining the average effect of
the independent predictor variables on the dependent
response variables. In this case, we determined the
effects of the network characteristics on standard

dominance. Using GEE, we determined the effects
averaged out over all standards organizations.
Dependent variable: Standard Dominance.
Standard dominance was operationalized by
determining the number of firms supporting the
standard. To determine the number of supporting
firms, we collected the total number of members
which we have termed network size. We considered
only corporate members and ignored individual
members, as the focus of this project is on firms and
standards organizations. As network characteristics
are not expected to influence network size
immediately, the effects of these variables have been
lagged by one year. This also partially corrects for
standards organizations that have just been founded
and have not had time to gain members. As the
number of members in standards organizations can
differ considerably, the distribution of organization
size is non-normal and positively skewed. We
therefore transformed the data by taking the
logarithm of network size to make the data
approximately normal.
Independent variable 1: Influential position. To
measure the value of the connections to the board
members, we used eigenvector centrality which
accounts for both direct and indirect ties. This
measure of centrality is positively related to social
capital and has been used to estimate the influence of
an actor [41]. Eigenvector centrality in bipartite
graphs has often been used in studies of interlocking
corporate boards to measure the centrality of the
actors.
Independent variable 2: Structural holes. To
measure the bridging of structural holes for
hypothesis 2, we used betweenness centrality. To
calculate betweenness centrality, we calculated all
possible shortest paths between nodes. Betweenness
centrality measures how many of these shortest paths
pass through a node [42]. In the bipartite graph, the
theoretical maximum number of shortest paths differs
from the one-mode case, hence a different
normalization is required. A node that connects
structural holes will lie on many of the shortest paths
connecting the two sides of the hole; consequently
this node will have a high betweenness centrality
[40]. Betweenness centrality is highly correlated with
structural holes [36] and has been used to measure
access to structural holes [26, 43].
Control variable: Year. The intercept for every
year is flexible. These flexible intercepts have been
fitted using a categorical year variable. This
procedure helps to account for exogenous effects
such as market or environmental factors. As
standards organizations experience similar events and
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a similar environment in the same year, the year
could affect the network size in certain years.

4. Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and the
correlations between the variables.

The resulting regression coefficients with the
standard errors are reported in Table 2. In the lower
part of this table, two goodness-of-fit indicators have
been added. As GEE estimates the parameters under
unknown correlation structures, the normal goodnessof-fit indices cannot be used. Instead, the Quasi
Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion
(QIC) and the Corrected Quasi Likelihood under
Independence Model Criterion (QICC) are used. Both
these fit indices are extensions of Akaike Information
Criterion. Smaller QIC and QICC indicate better
model fit.

significant effect. This change in regression weight
could be a sign of multicollinearity. This is also
suggested by the correlations in Table 1, which show
that influential position and structural holes are
significantly correlated. We also tested a fourth
model, which does not include structural holes. This
model resulted in positive and significant regression
weight for influential position at a lower QIC score
but at a higher QICC score. Therefore, it cannot be
indisputably determined whether this model is an
improvement over Model 3.All models that include
influential position result in positive and significant
regression weights, even at a very high confidence
interval. Furthermore, we can conclude from the QIC
and QICC scores that adding influential position
results in a better fitting model than the variable
intercept baseline model.
Therefore, we find support for the positive effects
of the influential position of the standards
organization in the network on the success of the
standards organization and find support for
Hypothesis 1. This implies that successful standards
organizations are positioned in an influential position
in the network of standards organizations and firms.
For hypothesis 2, the effect of structural holes in the
industry-wide standards network on standard
dominance, we found insufficient support. It should
be remarked that the literature on structural holes has
reached no consensus on the effects of structural
holes. One school of thought formed by Burt and
others proposes that value can be created if structural
holes are bridged [36, 37]. Another school of thought
emphasizes the trust generation function of networks.
A network without structural holes facilitates the
generation of trust. As all actors are connected to
each other, opportunistic behavior can be punished
through collective action [44]. Following this line of
thought, one would assume that a network with
structural holes would be less efficient in sharing
information. Standards organizations that bridge
structural holes may be faced with members that do
not trust each other, which would negatively affect
the performance of the standard. Ahuja [37] also
finds evidence for the negative effects of structural
holes. As evidence for both schools of thought has
been found, it is possible that bridging structural
holes might affect the standards organization both
positively and negatively. Hence, the total effect of
bridging structural holes may indeed be zero.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
Model 2, which includes structural holes but
without influential position, resulted in a positive and
significant regression weight for structural holes.
However, adding influential position removed this

This paper focuses on factors that affect the
outcome of standards battles. We have studied the
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influence of structural aspects of industry-wide
standards networks on standard dominance. We have
analyzed data from a dataset consisting of standards,
standards organizations, and firms participating in
these organizations, covering the period from 2000 to
2011. We found that a standards organization’s
influential position in an industry-wide standards
network positively affects the chances that its
standard achieves dominance. This is one of the first
studies that relates structural network characteristics
to standard dominance. So, for a standards
organization that is developing and promoting
standards for e.g. the internet of things it is important
to have an influential position in the industry-wide
standards network as it then has a higher chance of
achieving success with its standard.
This research has several theoretical implications
For innovation management in general and standards
and dominant designs in particular. First, although
the effect of the composition of standards networks in
relation to standard dominance has been researched
in several case studies of standards battles [5, 6], we
focus on the effect of network structure on standard
dominance; a topic that has been scarcely studied.
Secondly, longitudinal studies of standards networks
are lacking (one exception is Soh [33]). Our study
covers the period 2000-2011 and takes into account
the various changes that took place in the industrywide standards network during this period. Third, the
effect of a standards organization’s influential
position in an industry-wide standards network on
standard dominance has not been studied before. We
show that a standards organization’s influential
position in an industry-wide network positively
affects the chances that its standard achieves
dominance. Finally, this study provides additional
support for the notion that the outcome of standards
battles is not fully characterized by path dependency,
but that standard supporters can influence the
outcome. This is in line with results from prior
studies [24].
This research also has managerial implications.
Our results imply that support from influential firms
is needed to achieve a successful standard. Earlier
research has already indicated that firms with good
reputation and sales affect the success of standards
[45]. Our study indicates that besides these static
resources, it is important for a standards organization
to have members that are active in an industry-wide
network. To a certain extent, these effects will
accompany each other as powerful and influential
firms produce many products and therefore have
incentives to join many standards organizations. In
our findings, we see that the firms scoring the highest
on eigenvector centrality, used to measure influential

position, are well-known companies who are industry
leaders (examples are Dell, Intel, Microsoft,
Samsung, and Sony). Firms that develop standards
for e.g. the internet of things should actively involve
these industry leaders early in the standardization
process as they can exert influence in an industrywide standards network.
A limitation is that all ties of the industry-wide
network have been modeled as being equally strong.
Although all firms in the board can participate in the
decision making of the standards organization, some
firms might be more influential in this process. Large
firms or firms with specific capabilities and assets
might be able to exert more influence on the
development of the standard. Firms may participate
in the board of multiple standards organizations, but
their activity in these boards could differ. For
example, firms might be more actively involved in a
standards organization when the standard is more
important to the firm. Future research could attempt
to model these ties as ties of different strength. This
information, however, is often not available. Even if
this information was available, it would be difficult to
use as many network measures do not exist for
valued networks [40]. Another limitation is related to
the operationalization of standard dominance in terms
of the number of firms. Future research could attempt
to measure standard dominance more precise by
incorporating the size of the firms or even
incorporating the consumer perspective and
effectively operationalize standard dominance in
terms of market share per standard. Furthermore, we
focus on firms and standards organizations that are
active in the telecommunications, information
technology, and consumer electronics industry. The
question arises whether the results of our study are
specific for these particular industries or whether
similar results might apply for other industries.
Future research could explore this in more depth.
Finally, this study focuses on network structural
characteristics and their effect on standard
dominance. Future research could study the effect of
other aspects of the network that might affect
standard dominance such as its composition, the
strength of ties between actors within a standards
organization (in terms of e.g. the number of repeated
interactions), attunement or coordination in the
standards organization.
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